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CREATING A BECK STATUTE: RECENT
CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS AND A
PROPOSAL FOR THE FUTURE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the wake of a presidential campaign that cost hundreds of millions of dollars,' and as campaigns for political office become
increasingly competitive financially,2 inquiries have been made into
the financing of these undertakings.3 Contributions to these campaigns come from all facets of the society,4 including the nation's
labor unions.5 For instance, in the congressional races that culminated in November of 1996, the AFL-CIO union spent thirty-five
million dollars in an attempt to defeat the Republicans.6 As one
may surmise, the sources of these funds that unions utilize for political purposes often come from the dues and fees paid by union
members and contributors. 7 In addition, many of these due and fee
payers may object to the application of their contributions to political causes that they do not support.8
The typical union may receive funds in the form of dues and/or
fees from two principal sources: (a) union members, and (b) those
workers who are subject to a union security agreement or "agency
1. See Big Bucks, THE CAP. TuMEs, Oct. 26, 1996, at 11A available in 1996 WL
13786515 ("The known cost of this year's presidential election is a dizzying $800 million.").
2. See generally Charles Lewis, A Politicianand His Patrons: PresidentialCampaigns
are Less Horse Races Than Giant Auctions, CMRSTIAN SCi. MONrrOR, Feb. 20, 1996, at 19

("Our federal elections have become an exclusive 'pay-or-play' process.").
3. Id.
4. See Roger K. Lowe, Taxes Keep Ads Coming: Nation Has Poured$210 Million Into
PresidentialCampaign, COLUMBus DISPATCH, Oct. 28, 1996, at 3A.

5. See id.
6. See Kenneth Weinstein & Thomas Wielgus, A Worker's Right to Know, WASH.
TimEs, July 24, 1996, at A14.
7. See generally The Worker Right to Know Ac" Hearings on H.R. 3580 Before
the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the Comm. on Econ. and Educ.
Opportunities, 104th Cong. 33, 39 (1996) (statement of Charles R. Serio) (explaining that
workers should be able to object to their union dues and agency fees being used for political
purposes).
8. See Weinstein & Wielgus, supra note 6, at A14 ("[Als many as 40 percent of AFLCIO members may be forced to contribute to a campaign with which they disagree.").
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shop" arrangement. 9 An "'agency shop' [agreement] applies to an
arrangement under which all employees are required as a condition
of employment to pay dues to the union and pay the union's initiation fee, but they need not actually become union members."' 0 An
agreement of this kind is permitted by the National Labor Relations Act" and has been determined by the U.S. Supreme Court to
"not constitute an unfair labor practice."' This practice has a commonly stated purpose of preventing the problem of "'free riders"'
in union shops.' 3 "'Free riders"' is a phrase that connotes those
non-union member workers who do not contribute to the union in
the form of dues, but nonetheless receive the benefits of union representation,' 4 as unions must "represent all workers in a bargaining
unit" as part of their obligations as the collective bargaining representative. 15 The "agency shop" arrangement is the answer to this
problem, as a workplace may not require as a condition of employment, membership in a union. 6 The employer may however
require contributions to the union which often amount to the
equivalent of member dues, to pay for the cost of the union representing the employees' collective bargaining interests.1 1 It is said
then that while the National Labor Relations Act, upon a plain
reading, appears to allow employers and unions to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, their "'[m]embership'

. .

is whittled down to its financial core."1 8

9. See generally Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 738-39
(1988) (discussing that a union may collect dues and fees from union members, as well as
non-union members).
10. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 736 (1963).
11. See Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat.
136, 140-41 (1947) (amending National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449,
452 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994))) ("Provided, That nothing in this
Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment
membership therein ....

).

12. See General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. at 735.
13. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 761 (1961).
14. See id.
15. See The Worker Right to Know Act: Hearingson H.R. 3580 Before the Subcomm. on
Employer-Employee Relations of the Comm. on Econ. and Educ. Opportunities,104th Cong.
231 (1996) (statement of Charles W. Baird, Ph.D).

16. See General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. at 744.
17. See id. at 743.
18. 1d. at 742.
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These concepts had their origin in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.19
Before the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the 1935 Wagner Act
"permitted... 'closed shop' agreements" between employers and
collective bargaining representatives which resulted in employers
only hiring union members.2 ° The Congress then decided, under
pressure to do so, that these agreements "'create[d] too great a barrier to free employment to be longer tolerated.' "21 The Taft-Hartley Act then rid the practice of the "closed shop" agreements.2' It
also addressed the problem of "'free riders.' ,3 Because employers
and unions can require all of the represented workers to pay
"agency fees" to the union as a condition of employment and if the
union subsequently contributes money to a particular political
cause, there arises then a potential for mandatory payments to
political causes with which the contributor may strongly object.2 4
Although the subject of employees objecting to the uses a union
puts their contributions to dates back to cases arising under the
Railway Labor Act,2 5 the topic attracted increased scrutiny after a
United States Supreme Court case in 198826 and the attempted passage of the "Worker Right to Know Act"'2 7 and the "Worker
Paycheck Fairness Act."'
The "Worker Right to Know Act" or House Bill 3580, was a proposal for legislation introduced into Congress on June 5, 1996 by
Illinois Republican Congressman Harris Fawell. -9 The Act sought
to ensure that workers who pay fees or dues to a union have a right
to express their views when the union attempts to utilize the fees
for purposes other than the representation of the employees in the
bargaining unit. °
The "Worker Paycheck Fairness Act" or House Bill 1625 is
another legislative proposal that seeks to allow "workers to make
19. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 747-48.

20. See id.
21. Id. at 748 (quoting S. REP. No. 80-105, at 6 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATrvE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 412 (Comm. Print 1974)).

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Beck, 487 U.S. at 747-49.
See id. at 749 (quoting Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954)).
See Weinstein & Wielgus, supra note 6, at A14.
See, e.g., Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
See Beck, 487 U.S. 735.

27. Worker Right to Know Act, H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. (1996).
28. Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1625, 105th Cong. (1997).

29. See 142 CONG. REc. El010 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Rep. Fawell).
30. See H.R. 3580 § 3.
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individual and informed choices about the political, social, or charitable causes they support is protected to the greatest extent
possible."'"
What follows is an analysis of the differences between the proposed Acts and the Beck case as well as the potential for abuse
under the Acts. The analysis will essentially be based upon the purposes of the Acts and to whom they were or are to apply. Furthermore, it is also contended that the authors of both Bills failed to
take into account the specific holding of the Supreme Court in the
1988 Beck decision and hence made errors in the drafting of the
Acts.
II.

RELEVANT HISTORY CULMINATING IN THE ATTEMPTED
PASSAGE OF THE "WORKER RIGHT TO KNOW

ACT"

AND THE "WORKER PAYCHECK

FAIRNESS AT"

The Railway Labor Act provides in relevant part that
any carrier or carriers as defined in this Act and a labor organization or labor organizations duly designated and authorized to
represent employees in accordance with the requirements of this
chapter shall be permitted(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued
employment, that within sixty days following the beginning of
such employment, or the effective date of such agreements,
whichever is the later, all employees shall become members of
the labor organization representing their craft or class[.]3"
It was under this provision of The Railway Labor Act that the
first group of workers began to question the use of their union
contributions.3
In Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson,3 4 the Supreme
Court was faced with the question of the Constitutional validity of
"union shop" agreements in the context of the Railway Labor Act,
section 2, Eleventh. Here, a group of employees of a railroad company sought from the Court an injunction against the company and
labor organizations from enforcing the union shop agreement
31. Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1625, § 3, 105th Cong. (1997).
32. Railway Labor Act Amendment, ch. 1220, § 2, Eleventh, 64 Stat. 1238, 1238-39
(1951) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (a) (1994)).
33. See, e.g., Hanson, 351 U.S. 228.
34. 351 U.S. 225.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol15/iss1/8

4

1997]

Creating
a Beck
StatuteRecent Congressional Attempts and a Prop
Felsberg: Creating
a Beck
Statute:

because they claimed it "violate[d] the 'right to work' provision of
the Nebraska Constitution .... ,3 In ruling against the employees,
the Court found that "the requirement for financial support of the
collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its
work is within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause
3' 6
and does not violate either the First or the Fifth Amendments.
In a later case, the Supreme Court was again faced with a situation where a group of labor organizations and carriers entered into
a union security agreement.37 The agreement required that all
employees as a condition of employment make contributions to the
union.38 The issue in the case was whether the union could use the
contributions for political causes.39 The Court in Street held that a
union could not use the funds collected from these workers to support political causes that the worker opposed."n Using contributions for collective bargaining purposes was what made the "agency
shop" agreements legal to begin with.41 In its decision, the Court
discussed the "'free rider"' problem as another justification for the
collection of the "agency fees."'42 The Court suggested, but did not

43
order a system of remedies for the correction of this problem.
The issue eventually arose under the National Labor Relations
Act in Communications Workers of America v. Beck.' The Act in
its relevant portion, reads similarly to the Railway Labor Act portion that was discussed above. In fact, the Supreme Court has held
that section 8(a)(3) and section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor
Act are "'statutory equivalent[s] ' ' 46 and therefore, in questions
arising under the National Labor Relations Act, their decision in
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id. at 228.
Id. at 238.
See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 742 (1961).
See id at 742-44.
See id. at 768.
See id. at 769.

41. GeneralMotors Corp., 373 U.S. at 740-41.

42. See Street, 367 U.S. at 765-70.
43. See id. at 771-75.
44. See 487 U.S. 735, 739-40 (1988).
45. Compare Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8(a)(3), 61

Stat. 136, 140-41 (1947) (amending National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat.
449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994))), with Railway Labor Act Amendment,
ch. 1220, § 2, Eleventh, 64 Stat. 1238,1238-39 (1951) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 152,

Eleventh (a) (1994)).
46. Beck, 487 U.S. at 745-46 (1988) (quoting Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,452, n.

13 (1984)).
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Street is "controlling." 47 Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act reads as follows: "Provided,That nothing in this Act,
or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an
employer from making an agreement with a labor organization...
to require as a condition of employment membership
therein... .,48 Essentially, section 8(a)(3) allows an employer and
a union to enter into an agreement to force all employees of a
workplace to contribute "agency fees" to the union as a condition
of employment. 49 As in the Street case,50 the employees are not
actually union members and they are not technically paying "dues"
to the union.-" They are nonetheless required to contribute
"agency fees" to the union which often are the equivalent amount
of union member dues, as a prerequisite to the continuation of
employment. 2 While these agreements are indeed permitted
under the National Labor Relations Act, a question that arose
under the Railway Labor Act, similarly arose in this context,
namely whether these fees may be used by the union for purposes
other than "collective bargaining, contract administration, [and]
grievance adjustment" when the non-union member objected to
such use. 53 Similar to the situation in Street, the uses often include
political or social funding. 4
The Supreme Court decided "fee-objector[ ]" cases in the context
of the Railway Labor Act based on constitutional considerations.55
In the context of CommunicationsWorkers of America v. Beck, the
Supreme Court "specifically tied the 'Beck' rights of private sector
employees to the unions' duty of fair representation under section
8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act. ' 56 In Beck, a
group of non-union member employees who nonetheless contrib47. Beck, 487 U.S. at 745.
48. See Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat.
136, 140-41 (1947) (amending National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449

(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994))).
49. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743 (1963).
.50. See 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
51. Beck, 487 U.S. at 745.
52. See id.; Street, 367 U.S. 740.
53. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 745; Street, 367 U.S. 740.
54. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 745; Street, 367 U.S. 740.
55. See The Worker Right to Know Act: Hearingson H.R. 3580 Before the Subcomm. on
Employer-Employee Relations of the Comm. on Econ. and Educ. Opportunities,104th Cong.
211 (1996) (statement of Marshall J.Breger).
56. Id.
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uted to the union in the form of "agency fees" as a condition of
employment, brought suit challenging the fact that the union was
able to use their contributions for purposes other than "collective
57
bargaining, contract administration, [and] grievance adjustment.
The employees contended that their right to fair representation,
their First Amendment rights, section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act and particular common law fiduciary duties were violated.5 8 Tracing their decision in Street, the Supreme Court found
that section 8(a)(3) did not allow the union to use the contributions
of the objecting non-member employees for purposes other than
those "necessary to 'performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.' ' 9 Unlike in Street, where the Court did not
provide for a remedy, the Court this time held that the remedy for
this practice would be a refund of all of the objecting non-members'
fees.6" Essentially then, the Court was saying that once an
employee joined a union, he or she could not object to how their
fees were utilized.6 '
It wasn't until eight years following the Beck decision that the
National Labor Relations Board was faced with the application of
Beck.6' In California Saw & Knife Works, the National Labor
Relations Board actually decided twelve cases that dealt with the
varying requirements under Beck. 63 The decision focused on essentially four issues: (a) notice of Beck rights to employees; (b) refund
procedures as per Beck; (c) amount of the refund and what constitutes "collective bargaining" purposes and (d) enforcement of Beck
rights. 64 As to the requirement of notice under Beck, the Board
57. See 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988).
58. See id. at 740.
59. See id. at 762-63.
60. Id.
61. See Kenneth Weinstein & Thomas Wielgus, A Worker's Right to Know, WASH.
TmiEs, July 24, 1996, at A14.
62. See The Worker Right to Know Act: Hearingson H.R. 3580 Before the Subcomm. on
Employer-Employee Relations of the Comm. on Econ. and Educ. Opportunities, 104th Cong.
210 (1996) (statement of Marshall J. Breger).
63. See 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995); ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 1087 (12th ed. 1991).
64. See California Saw & Knife, 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995); The Worker Right to Know
Act: Hearings on H.R. 3580 Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the
Comm. on Econ. and Edua Opportunities, 104th Cong. 210 (1996) (statement of Marshall J.
Breger).
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found that new employees and present employees must be given
notice of their rights.6 5 In the case immediately facing the Board,
the notice was printed inside the cover of a union magazine, which
the Board held to be sufficient notice.66 Secondly, the Board
approved of the objection procedures in place for non-member
employees who wished to object to the uses to which their union
contributions were applied. 67 In the instant case, the procedure8
involved the non-members mailing the objections to the treasurer.
While the Board implemented the Beck rights, it was not immediately clear what actually constituted uses that relate to "collective
bargaining."69 In this regard, the Board permitted the use of inhouse auditors to review the allocation of expenses.7 ° In a sort of
criticism, it has been mentioned that while the Board made the
above determinations, it has not outlined any indications as to what
penalties will ensue if a union fails to abide by the Beck decision.71
According to the proponents and sponsors of the "Worker Right
to Know Act," there has been "little action" involving the Beck
decision or any application of it by the National Labor Relations
Board with the exception of the CaliforniaSaw & Knife decision.72
Moreover, according to Harris Fawell, the sponsor of the "Worker
Right to Know Act," following Beck, if a union employee wanted to
object to the usage of his dues for purposes other than "collective
bargaining, contract administration [and] grievance adjustment," he
or she would have to engage in a complicated procedure, namely
having to leave the union in order to object.73
III.

THm

"WORKER RIGHT TO

KNow AcT"

In June of 1996, former union member, Harris Fawell,74 the
Republican Congressman from Illinois presented to Congress, the
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
A21.
74.

See CaliforniaSaw & Knife, 320 N.L.R.B. at 224, 231.
See id. at 231.
See Breger, supra note 62, at 216.
See Breger, supra note 62, at 215.
See Breger, supra note 62, at 216-17.
See Breger, supra note 62, at 217.
See Breger, supra note 62, at 218.
Worker Right to Know Act, H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. § 2 (1996).
See Harris Fawell, Workers Have a Right to Know, WASH. TIMEs, June 17, 1996, at
See Bob Estill, Rep. Fawell,Labor Square OffOver Dues, ST.J. REo., June 21, 1996,

at 10.
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"Worker Right to Know Act."7 5 The Act was part of a larger bill
aimed at campaign finance reform.76 The Act attempted
to ensure that workers who are required to pay union dues as a
condition of employment have adequate information about how

the money they pay in dues to a union is spent and to remove
obstacles to the ability of working people to exercise their right
to object to the use of their dues ....77

The Act had as its intended goals the following: to require a
union (a) to obtain a signed written authorization from all employees expressing their intention of allowing the union to use the fees
for non-collective bargaining purposes; 78 (b) to renew this written

authorization annually between the months of September and
October;79 (c) to disclose to the employee a ratio of which particular purposes the fees were applied, as conducted by an independent
auditor;"0 (d) to ensure that all workers who contributed to the
union would be equally involved in the union's collective bargaining activities; 8 ' and (e) to ensure that workers could not be required
to join a union as a full fledged member as a condition of employment.s The Act would accomplish these goals by amending the
National Labor Relations Act particularly, sections 7 and 8.83 The
Bill also sought to amend the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 in its "Disclosure to Workers" section 4 as
well as the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 in its "Worker
Consent" section. Touted as the Bill that would "implement [the]
Beck" decision, 6 the "Worker Right to Know Act" was defeated by
75. See 142 CONG. REc. El010 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Rep. Fawell).
76. See Union Dues: Worker Right to Know Falls with Defeat in House of Campaign
Finance Reform, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 144, at A-15 (July 26, 1996).
77. H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. § 3 (1996).
78. See H.R. 3580, § 5; Tom Strong, Illinois Lawmaker's Plan Angers Unions:
Republican Wants Unions to Get Members' Permission to Spend Dues Money on Political
Causes, PEORIA J. STAR,July 8, 1996, at B1.
79. See H.R.3580, § 5; Strong, supra note 78, at 31.
80. See H.R. 3580, § 5; Strong, supra note 78, at B1.
81. See H.R. 3580, § 7; Strong, supra note 78, at B1.
82. See Strong, supra note 78, at B1.
83. See Worker Right to Know Act, H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. §§ 4-7 (1996).
84. See id. § 8.
85. See id. § 5.
86. See Union Dues: Worker Right to Know Falls with Defeat, supra note 76, at A-16.
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a vote of 259 to 162 in the United States House of Representatives
on July 25, 1996.87

IV. THE

"WORKER PAYCHECK FAIRNESS

Acr"

In 1997, Harris Fawell attempted again to address the issue of the
uses to which the union applied its contributions in his new Bill, the
"Worker Paycheck Fairness Act" or House Bill 1625.88 The Bill
again seeks to require unions to obtain pre-authorization from each
worker before it may use their contributions for uses not related to
the collective bargaining representation. 8 9 The Bill also provides for
a revocation of the authorization as well as a civil cause of action by
an employee against the labor organization when the organization
does not abide by the authorization procedure or influences an
employee from exercising his or her rights under the Bill.9 Moreover, as in the "Worker Right to Know Act," the "Worker
Paycheck Fairness Act" provides for a written notice outlining the
authorization procedures as well as an allocated expense report. 91
The House Committee on Education and the Workforce considered and approved a marked-up version of the Bill by "a voice
vote" on October 8, 1997. 92
V.

DIFFERING VIEWS ON THE

A.

ACrs

"Worker Right to Know Act"

Hailed as the workers' "'procedural bill of rights," 93 which had
tenets involving "'notice, consent, and disclosure[,]"' 94 the "Worker
Right to Know Act" has attracted many contrasting views on its
attributes and deficiencies.9 Harris Fawell drafted the Act in reaction to workers' experiences when they tried to exercise their rights
pursuant to the Beck decision: "They told of suffering union refus87. See Union Dues: Worker Right to Know Falls with Defeat, supra note 76, at A-16.
88. See Unions: Bill Aimed at PoliticalSpending with Union Funds Introduced by Fawell,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 95, at A-2 (May 16, 1997).
89. See Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1625, § 4(a), 105th Cong. (1997).
90. See id. § 4(c).
91. See id. §§ 5, 6.
92. See Union Dues: House Panel Approves Bill Setting Limits on Unions' Use of Dues
for Certain Purposes,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 196, at AA-1 (Oct. 9, 1997).
93. See Union Dues: Worker Right to Know Falls with Defeat, supra note 76, at A-16.
94. See Union Dues: Worker Right to Know Falls with Defeat, supra note 76, at A-16.
95. See infra notes 96-140 and accompanying text.
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als, threats, intimidation, indignities and intolerable delays in their
efforts to resign from the union and to seek rebates as guaranteed
by Beck." 96 Moreover, some union member workers told of threats
of job termination by the union when they contemplated exercising
their Beck rights.97 Fawell also said that "[w]orkers have a right to
know why money is taken out of their paychecks and how that
money is used, and a right to stop money from being taken
out of
98
their paychecks for purposes with which they disagree."'
In supporting the Act as a sponsor, Newt Gingrich has maintained that a bill of this sort is needed for today's workers because
under the present situation, it may take up to eight years to process
a Beck request and all the while the worker's cohorts urge him or
her to drop the request in order to prevent "'mak[ing] trouble.' "99
Although these accounts may be enough to justify the aims of the
"Worker Right to Know Act," there exists situations where the
worker may not even know of the rights due to them under Beck. 100
Peter Eide from the United States Chamber of Commerce maintained that many workers are not aware of their rights under
Beck. '' He also said that if the workers were aware, they could
petition the union for rebates if they were sure that they would not
be retaliated against.' 012 In fact, a poll has indicated that seventyeight percent of workers are not aware of their rights pursuant to
the Beck decision. 0 Even if the workers are made aware of their
Beck rights, Diane Generous of the National Association of Manufacturers claimed that the reason the "Worker Right to Know" legislation is needed is that nobody actually knows how much money is
spent for purposes that would justify rebates to contributors. 0 4
96. Harris Fawell, Workers Have a Right to Know, WASH. TImEs, June 17, 1996, at A21
(emphasis added).

97. Id.
98. Union Dues: House Reschedules Debate on Campaign Finance Bill, Worker Right to

Know, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 139, at A-10 (July 19, 1996).
99. See Labor Law: House GOPLeaders Unveil Union Dues Bill, as Gingrich Criticizes
AFL-CIO, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 109, at AA-2 (June 6, 1996).
100. Union Dues: HearingSet on Union Dues Bil4 Backed By GOP Leadership, Business,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 110, at A-7 (June 7, 1996).

101.
102.
103.
TMis,

Id.
Id.
See Kenneth Weinstein & Thomas Wielgus, A Worker's Right to Know, WASH.
July 24, 1996, at A14.

104. See Union Dues: Hearing Set on Union Dues Bill, Backed by GOP Leadership,

Business, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 110, at A-7 (June 6, 1996).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

11

Hofstra
Labor
and&Employment
Journal, Vol. 15,[Vol.
Iss. 115:247
[1997], Art. 8
Hofstra
Labor
Employment Law
Law Journal

Because the Bill came to light the summer prior to the nation's
elections, the union critics of the legislation called it "GOP election-year grandstanding."' 5 AFL-CIO President John Sweeney
maintained that the Act was merely "retaliation[ ]" against unions
by the Republican leaders and that "'unions already have more
financial disclosure requirements than any other organization in the
country."""° Others maintained that the Bill is unfair as it allows
non-members to participate equally with members in the affairs of
the union.10 7
Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr. from the National Right to Work
Legal Defense Foundation, the organization that represented Mr.
Beck in Communications Workers of America v. Beck, found
strengths in the Bill, but nevertheless did withdraw his support. 10 8
He submitted that the Bill made some progress in removing the
term "membership" from the National Labor Relations Act, which
appears to allow the union and the employer to require membership in a union as a condition of employment 0 9 while contradicting
the holdings of NLRB v. GeneralMotors Corp."0 and Communications Workers of America v. Beck."' This language, as LaJeunesse
claimed, could be used by unions to mislead employees."12 Moreover, LaJeunesse applauded the authorization required by the Bill
but advocated an option to allow a revocation of the authorization
when the union subsequently utilizes the money to support causes
with which the worker "disagrees.""' Finally, he also felt that the
Act would have done an effective job of eliminating the "Hobson's
choice" of a worker having to leave a union in order to exercise his
or her Beck rights." 4
105. See id. at A-6.
106. See Labor Law: House GOPLeaders Unveil Union Dues Bill, as Gringrich Criticizes

AFL-CIO, supra note 99, at AA-2.
107. Union Dues: Worker Right to Know Falls With Defeat in House of Campaign Finance

Reform, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 144, at A-16 (July 26, 1996).
108. Hearings on H.R. 3580, The Worker Right to Know Act Before the Subcomm. on

Employer-Employee Relations of the Comm. on Econ. and Educ. Opportunities, 104th Cong.
301, 301-05 (1996) (testimony of Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr.).
109. See id. at 302.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

373 U.S. 734 (1963).
487 U.S. 735 (1988).
See LaJeunesse, supra note 108, at 302-03.
See LaJeunesse, supra note 108, at 304.
See LaJeunesse, supra note 108, at 304.
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LaJeunesse, however, did not support the Bill because he claimed
that this type of act still forces a worker to contribute to the union
"as a condition of employment.""' 5 This in turn, he claimed, calls
into question section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act
which allows State Right to Work laws." 6 LaJeunesse rightfully
pointed out that the Act does not articulate what exactly is
"'related to' collective bargaining"-the NLRB and the court could
then rationally relate anything to these areas, thus giving unions
wide latitude." 7
Conversely, Charles W. Baird, Ph.D. a Professor of Economics
and Director of the Smith Center for Private Enterprise Studies at
California State University advocated the "Worker Right to Know
Act" on the basis of a moral choice." 8 He expressed concern for
the "pressure" that member employees face if they decide to file a
Beck claim and advocated the amendment of the National Labor
Relations Act with a new section 8(h) that would secure from the
workers written authorization for the use of the funds." 9 Moreover, Dr. Baird also claimed that the Act's section 8(b)(1) amendment allowing those workers who claim Beck rights the opportunity
to participate in the affairs of the union, would correct the current
practice of forcing members to drop out of the union. 2 ° He also
rejected the arguments of critics that the disclosure requirements
would bankrupt local unions and that the Act would violate a
union's First Amendment rights."2 ' He said that the unions
"brought this on themselves" and that the First Amendment does
not permit unions
to take anything away from a person "against
22
their xVinl."

1

It is interesting to note that some who supported the Bill nonetheless found room for improvement."2 Hon. Marshall J. Breger
115. See LaJeunesse, supra note 108, at 305.
116. See LaJeunesse, supra note 108, at 305.
117. See LaJeunesse, supra note 108, at 308.
118. See Hearingson H.R. 3580, The Worker Right to Know Act Before the Subcomm. on
Employer-Employee Relations of the Comm. on Econ. and Educ. Opportunities, 104th Cong.
233 (1996) (statement of Charles W. Baird, Ph.D.).
119. See id. at 234.
120. See id. at 235.
121. See id. at 235-36.
122. See id. at 235-36.
123. See Hearingson H.R. 3580, The Worker Right to Know Act Before the Subcomm. on
Employer-Employee Relations of the Comm. on Econ. and Educ. Opportunities, 104th Cong.

210 (1996) (statement of Hon. Marshall J. Breger).
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from the Columbus School of Law at the Catholic University of
America claimed that the "Worker Right to Know Act" made "a
good start" in addressing Beck issues.'" 4 He claimed that the Act
did a good job of addressing the notice problem associated with
Beck.'25 He also maintained that the prior written authorization
"opt-in" procedure is "fairer" than an "opt-out" procedure. 26
Moreover, Mr. Breger felt the fact that the Bill gave the non-union
member the same rights as the member to participate in collective
bargaining activities, is "a point of basic fairness" because it
involves decisions that affect the "workers basic livelihood."' 2 7 Mr.
Breger did claim that the Bill stops short of giving descriptions of
28
the allocation of expenses as to the refund process under Beck.1
He also said that the Act does not mention the specifics of "rules
and procedures for Beck arbitration proceedings or whether any
special statutory penalties for obstructing implementation of Beck
rights are appropriate."' 2 9
James B. Coppess, a representative from the Communications
Workers of America, in commenting on the "Worker Right to
Know Act" claimed it is inconceivable to believe that political activity has nothing to do with collective bargaining and employment. 30
He claimed that unions do not hide their political affiliations. 3 '
Consequently, he maintained, employees know when they vote for
union representation, that unions try to "advance [their] member
interests" through political activity. 32 He claimed that workers
know this "when they vote on the level of dues" and who will control the union's goals. 33 He felt that they are aware of this factor
when "they vote to approve collective bargaining agreements containing union security clauses ....,,134
124. See id.at 218.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See id.at 218-19.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 221.
See id. at 226.
Id. at 227.

130. See Hearingson H.R. 3580, The Worker Right to Know Act Before the Subcomm. on
Employer-Employee Relations of the Comm. on Econ. and Educ. Opportunities,104th Cong.

319 (1996) (statement of James B. Coppess).
131. See id. at 320.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. Id.
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H.R. 3580 punishes unions that engage in political activity. The
bill effectively bars workers from joining such unions unless they
annually restate their support for the union's political program.
And it imposes onerous accounting requirements that would cost
unions upwards of $200 million a year. Under the bill, the only
way for a union to escape these measures is to foreswear any
political activity[,]

said Coppess. 35
Others who opposed the Act claimed that in recent times, very
few workers actually petition the union for their rebates under
Beck. 136 Jeff Miller from the Communications Workers of America,
while opposing the Bill, maintained that very little money in the
Communications Workers of America union is spent on political
purposes and that in their organization, workers are already made
aware through an adequate accounting structure of how their funds
are allocated. 137 Additionally, Accountant Thomas E. Seay claimed
that local unions will not be able to keep up financially with the
reporting requirements under the Act.1 38 He also said that the Act
is misplaced as many local unions do not concentrate on political
contributions. 139 Accordingly, others claimed that the Act as it
stands "far exceeds what is required by the Beck decision."' 4 °
B.

"Worker Paycheck FairnessAct"

Harris Fawell, the sponsor of the "Worker Paycheck Fairness
Act" and other supporters of the Bill say that it "codifies" the Beck
decision. 4 ' Other prominent leaders in the labor community have
voiced their opposition to the Bill. William Gould, the Chairman of
the National Labor Relations Board says that the Act is not needed

135. Id. at 321.
136. Union Dues: HearingSet on Union Dues Bill, Backed by GOP Leadership, Business,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 110, at A-7 (June 7, 1996).

137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Union Dues: Worker Right to Know Falls with Defeat in House of Campaign
Finance Reform, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 144, at A-16 (July 26, 1996).

141. Union Dues: House PanelApproves Bill Setting Limits on Unions' Use of Dues for
Certain Purposes,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 196, at AA-1 (Oct. 9, 1997).
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because workers have already authorized the spending of funds on
certain non-representative purposes. 42 Chairman Gould said that
workers already have presumptively given permission for unions
to make such expenditures by voting in the union in NLRB-conducted elections or through some other method demonstrating
majority support. Workers may be very much influenced by
whether a trade union is aligned with the Democratic Party, the
Republican Party or some other party in
determining whether
43
they want the union to represent them.
Chairman Gould also questioned the provision in the Act
allowing liability to flow from violations of the Act, asking whether
it would apply to all sections of the National Labor Relations
Act. 144
Alexis Herman, the Labor Secretary of the United States, also
attacked the Bill. 145 The Labor Secretary maintained that the Bill's
"'opt-in"' procedure is the opposite of the Beck "'opt-out"' procedure.'4 6 Hon. Herman added that "'there is no basis for creating a
special class of union members who enjoy all of the benefits of
union membership but share only some of the financial
responsibilities.' ,,147

VI.

PROBLEMS WITH THE DRAFrs OF THE BILLS

A.

"Worker Right to Know Act"

Before an adequate analysis of the problems of the draft of the
Bill can begin, it is first necessary to outline the changes that it
sought to make to the National Labor Relations Act, section
302(c)(4) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 and section 201(b) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.148
The authors of the Bill claimed that
142. See Oct. 8 Speech by NLRB Chairman William B. Gould to the Iowa Chapterof the

Industrial Relations Research Association, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at E-4 (Oct. 8,
1997).
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. See Union Dues: House PanelApproves Bill, supra note 141, at AA-1.
146. See Union Dues: House PanelApproves Bill, supra note 141, at AA-1.
147. See Union Dues: House PanelApproves Bill, supra note 141, at AA-1.
148. Worker Right to Know Act, H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. (1996).
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[t]he purpose of this Act is to ensure that workers who are
required to pay union dues as a condition of employment have
adequate information about how the money they pay in dues to a
union is spent and to remove obstacles to the ability of working
people to exercise their right to object to the use of their dues
for political, legislative, social, or charitable causes with which
they disagree, or for other activities not necessary to performing
the duties of the exclusive representative of employees
in dealing
149
with the employer on labor-management issues.
The Bill attempted to make substantive changes to the text of the

National Labor Relations Act sections 7 and 8.150 First, the Bill
amended section 7 of the Act by substituting language for the word
"'membership."""' The Act in section 7 would then have read as
follows: 152

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring 'the payment to
a labor organizationof dues or fees related to collective bargaining, contract administration,or grievance adjustment necessary to
performing the duties of exclusive representationas a condition of
employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).15'
In the "Unfair Labor Practice" section, the Act would have
amended section 8 (a)(3) to read as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall
preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
149. Id. § 3.
150. Id.
151. Id. § 4.
152. The changes that the "'Worker Right to Know Act"' sought to make are indicated
by an italic font with the exception of the word "Provided." This indication will apply to the
text accompanying notes 153 to 165.
153. See Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 7, 61 Stat. 136, 140
(1947) (amending National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994))); H.R. 3580 (emphasis added).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

17

Hofstra
Labor
and&Employment
Iss. 115:247
[1997], Art. 8
Hofstra
Labor
Employment Law
Law Journal,
Journal Vol. 15, [Vol.

organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any
action defined in section 8(a) of this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment 'the payment to
such labor organizationof dues or fees related to collective bargaining, contract administration,or grievance adjustment necessary to performing the duties of exclusive representation'1 5 4 ...

The Act also sought to ensure the requirement of the written
authorization by adding a new section (h) to the end of section 8 of
the National Labor Relations Act: 55
'(h) An employee subject to an agreement between an employer
and a labor organization requiringthe payment of dues or fees to
such organization as authorized in section 8(a)(3) may not be
required to pay such organization, nor may such organization
accept payment of,any dues or fees not related to collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment necessary to performing the duties of exclusive representationunless the
employee has agreed to pay such dues or fees in a signed written
agreement that must be renewed between the first day of September and the first day of October of each year. Such signed written
agreementshall include a ratio certified by an independent auditor,
of the dues or fees related to collective bargaining,contract administration, or grievance adjustment necessary to performing the
duties of exclusive
representation and the dues or fees related to
56
otherpurposes."1

Additionally, the Act sought to amend the Labor Management

Relations Act, 1947, section 302(c)(4) in a similar fashion by providing for the requirement of written authorization before a labor
organization could use dues for purposes other than "collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment."' 57
The Act further attempted to ensure that the workers subject to
such circumstances receive notice of their right to only contribute
fees used for collective bargaining by adding another new section to

154. See Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 136,
140-41 (1947) (amending National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994))); H.R. 3580 (emphasis added).
155. See Worker Right to Know Act, H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. (1996).
156. See id. § 5(a).
157. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120,61 Stat. 136, 157 (1947) (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 186 (1994)); H.R. 3580, § 5(b).
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section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act; section (i).158 The
section would have read:
'(i) An employer shall be required to post a notice, of such size
and in such form as the Board shall prescribe, in conspicuous
places in and about its plants and offices, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted, informing
employees of their rights under section 7 of this Act and clarifying
to employees that an agreement requiring the payment of dues or
fees to a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in subsection (a)(3) may only require that employees
pay to such organizationany dues or fees related to collective bargaining, contract administration,or grievance adjustment necessary to performing the duties of exclusive representation. A copy
of such notice shall be provided to each employee not laterthan 10
days after the first day of employment.'159
Moreover, the Act in its "Worker Economic Rights" section
sought to ensure that all employees who pay fees to a union have
the right to participate in the union in activities related to "collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment."' 60 The Act attempted to accomplish this by amending
section 8(b)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act to read as
follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
fights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph
shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its
own ruleswith respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein 'except that, an employee subject to an agreement
between an employer and a labor organizationrequiringas a condition of employment the payment of dues or fees to such organization as authorized in subsection (a)(3), who pays such dues or
fees, shall have the same right to participatein the affairs of the
organization related to collective bargaining,contract administration, or grievance adjustment as any member of the orgqnization;'
or (B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the
158. CompareLabor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, see. 101, § 8,61 Stat. 136,
140-43 (1947) (amending National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198,49 Stat. 449,452-53
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994))), with H.R. 3580, § 6.
159. H.R. 3580, § 6.
160. Id. § 7.
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purposes of161 collective bargaining or the adjustment of
grievances[.]
The Act, as was discussed above, also attempted to ensure effective reporting procedures so that members could make an accurate
assessment as to what resources were used for "collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment.' ' 162 To this
end, the Act sought to amend section 201(b) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 through the addition of
a sentence at the end of the section:
'Every labor organizationshall be requiredto attributeand report
expenses by function classification in such detail as necessary to
allow its members to determine whether such expenses were related
to collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance
adjustment necessary to performing the duties63of exclusive representation or were related to other purposes.'1
Also amended in this regard would have been section 201(c) of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.164
As amended the section would have read as follows:
Every labor organization required to submit a report under this
title shall make available the information required to be contained in such report to all of its members 'and employees
requiredto pay any dues or fees to such organization',and every
such labor organization and its officers shall be under a duty
enforceable at the suit of any member 'or employee required to
pay any dues or fees to such organization'of such organization in
any State court of competent jurisdiction or in the district court
of the United States for the district in which such labor organization maintains its principal office, to permit such member 'or
employee required to pay any dues or fees to such organization'
for just cause to examine any books, records, and accounts necessary to verify such report. The court in such action may, in its
discretion, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or
161. See Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8(b)(1), 61 Stat. 136,
141 (1947) (amending National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1994))); H.R. 3580, § 7.
162. See H.R. 3580, § 8(a).
163. Compare Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519,
524-25, Pub. L. No. 86-257 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1994)), with
H.R. 3580, § 8(a).
164. Compare Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519,
525, Pub. L. No. 86-257 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1994)), with
H.R. 3580, § 8(b)(1), (2).
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plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's
fee to be paid by the
165
defendant, and costs of the action.
As was discussed above, the Act attempted to pick up where
Beck left off and enable workers to ascertain how their fees would
be used as evidenced by the sponsor of the Bill, Harris Fawell touting the Act as "mak[ing] real the rights created by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Communication [sic] Workers of America versus
Beck.' 166 In July of 1996, co-sponsor of the Bill, Newt Gingrich
commented on the purposes of the Act saying:
'Union members have a right to know how their money is spent,
which of their dues is taken out for representational purposes,
and which of their dues is taken out for non-representational purposes[.] All we are doing, is putting into legislation rights that the
Supreme Court said were due to working people [in the Beck
decision]." 6 7
As will become clear, the Act is inconsistent with the specific
holding of Beck.
B.

"Worker Paycheck FairnessAct"

Unlike the "Worker Right to Know Act," the "Worker Paycheck
Fairness Act" does not attempt to amend the National Labor Relations Act. 1 68 However, the Act, like the "Worker Right to Know
Act," does seek to amend the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.169 The Bill simply provides for the labor
organization to obtain written permission from each worker as a
prerequisite to using the funds for purposes other than collective
bargaining.1 7 In its portion most relevant to the scope of this Note,
the Bill provides:
(1) Authorization. -A labor organization accepting payment of
any dues or fees from an employee as a condition of employment
pursuant to an agreement authorized by Federal law must secure
165. Compare Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519,
525, Pub. L. No. 86-257 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1994)), with
H.R. 3580, § 8(b)(1), (2).
166. 142 CONG. REc. E1010 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Rep. Fawell).

167. See Union Dues: Worker Right to Know Falls With Defeat in House of Campaign
Finance Reform, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 144, at A-16 (July 26, 1996) (emphasis added).

168. See Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1625, 105th Cong. (1997).
169. See id. § 6.
170. See id. § 4(a).
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from each employee prior, voluntary, written authorization for
any portion of such dues or fees which will be used for activities
not necessary to performing the duties of the exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labormanagement issues.
(2) Requirements.-Such written authorization shall clearly
state that an employee may not be required to provide such
authorization and that if such authorization is provided, the
employee agrees to allow any dues or fees paid to the labor
organization to be used for activities which are not necessary to
performing the duties of exclusive representation
and which may
171
be political, social, or charitable in nature.
The Act also outlaws retaliation and coercion by a labor organization against an employee. 172 The employee is also entitled to
bring a civil cause of action against any labor organization who violates either the authorization section or the retaliation provision. 73
Moreover, the Act mandates that the employer is to post a notice
informing all of the workers of the above authorization provision.174 Lastly, the Act, like the "Worker Right to Know Act,"
seeks to amend sections 201(b) and (c) of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 to require every labor organization to provide an allocation of expenses that allow the workers
to ascertain whether the expenses were related to collective bargaining or not.' 75 Section 205(b) would also be amended to require
"the Secretary [to] make available complete copies of any report or
other document filed pursuant to section 201."' 176

As was mentioned above, Harris Fawell maintained that "the bill
simply codifies the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Communications Workers of America v. Beck,"'1 77 as he similarly did while supporting the "Worker Right to Know Act."' 78 As will become clear,
for the same reasons that the "Worker Right to Know Act" was
inconsistent with the Beck decision, the "Worker Paycheck Fairness
Act" is inconsistent as well.
171. Id.
172. Id. § 7.
173. Id. § 4(c).

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. § 5.
Id. § 6.
Id. § 6(c).
See Union Dues: House Panel Approves Bill, supra note 141, at AA-1.
See Union Dues: Worker Right to Know Falls With Defeat, supra note 167, at A-16.
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The "agency fee" arrangement was created to prevent non-union
members from benefitting from the collective bargaining representation by a union while not paying for the service. 179 Essentially
then, the "agency fee" situation sought to prevent "'free riding"' by
non-union members." It is submitted that the problem of "'free
riding"' would be magnified by allowing union members to refuse
to pay for union contributions utilized for nonrepresentational purposes. If union members are paying identical amounts as nonunion members for the collective bargaining representation, then
the option of not joining a union becomes moot. A worker could
just simply pay for the collective bargaining uses and then refuse to
pay for the political contributions, yet all the while receive the benefits of unionism (e.g. benefits that result from the union's contributions to political causes). The result is 'free riding"' by union
members. Alexis Herman expressed this concern in commenting
on the "Worker Paycheck Fairness Act."' 81 This leads to a proposal
for legislation that lawmakers may wish to follow in a future
attempt to secure the aims of the well-intended "Worker Right to
Know Act."
The "Worker Right to Know Act" sought and the "Worker
Paycheck Fairness Act" seeks to require written authorization from
all workers before a union could utilize their fees and dues for political, non-collective bargaining purposes. 82 The Acts, as distinguished from Beck make no distinction between non-members and
union members.1 3 Remaining consistent with Beck, it would make
better sense to require unions to inform prospective union members
of the planned contributions of the union to non-collective bargaining areas. Essentially, this would provide for a planned budget
before any of the workers in the unit join the union. The budget
would take into account the concerns of the drafters of the "Worker
Right to Know Act" by requiring that this budget be reviewed by
179. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734,741 (1963) (citing S.Rep. No. 80105, at 7 (1951) reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATrVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
AcT, 1947, at 413).
180. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734,741 (1963) (citing S.Rep. No. 80105, at 7 (1951) reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS

RELATONS AcT, 1947,

at 413).

181. See Union Dues: House Panel Approves Bill Setting Limits on Unions' Use of Dues
for Certain Purposes, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 196, at AA-1 (Oct. 9, 1997).

182. Worker Right to Know Act, H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. § 5 (1996).
183. See id.
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an outside, disinterested auditor. This proposal would enable prospective union members to make informed decisions about the prospects of joining a particular union. This process could be
performed annually so as to ensure that union members who joined
the union under one assumption of how their fees would be utilized
would not be surprised later when the union decides to contribute
to a cause with which the member disagrees. The union could
remain the collective bargaining representative, but the issue of fees
being used for non-collective bargaining purposes would be open
for consideration by all employees.
This proposal is consistent with Beck, while nonetheless taking
into account the concerns of the drafters of the Bills. Those workers
who are informed of the proposed use of the funds could decide
prior to joining the union, whether they wished to participate.
Once they joined however, they would essentially be giving
approval to the union's plans and would be unable to object later.
This is entirely consistent with Beck where the Supreme Court was
concerned with the plight of non-union workers and not union
members.' The Beck Court in its decision expressed the concern
of the drafters of the Taft-Hartley Act, that Congress did not want
to become involved in the inner workings of a private voluntary
union organization.' 85 The proposal also addresses these latter concerns of the Supreme Court. If enacted, it would also be consistent
with the comments of Chairman Gould concerning the "Worker
Paycheck Fairness Act.' 86 As Chairman Gould reasoned, when
the workers have voted in a collective bargaining representative,
they have essentially authorized any spending that the union
attempts. 87 Similarly, when the workers make an informed decision as to whether to join a union, as this proposal will ensure, they
should not be able to later object.
VII.

SUGGESTIONS FOR A

FUTURE
Acr"

"WORKCER RIGHT TO KNOW

What follows is the author's proposal for legislation that would
amend the National Labor Relations Act by incorporating the con184.
185.
186.
187.

Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 759 (1988).
IL at 758.
See Oct 8 Speech by NLRB Chairman William B. Gould, supra note 142, at E-4.
See Oct. 8 Speech by NLRB Chairman William B. Gould, supra note 142, at E-4.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol15/iss1/8

24

1997]

Creating
a Beck
Statute
Felsberg: Creating
a Beck
Statute:
Recent Congressional Attempts and a Prop

cerns of the sponsors of the "Worker Right to Know Act," but at
the same time staying consistent with the holding of the Supreme
Court in CommunicationsWorkers of America v. Beck."' The pro-

posed legislation would essentially amend the same sections as the
"Worker Right to Know Act" and also re-propose some of the
changes that were made therein. 89 Moreover, the proposal would
incorporate some of the additional concerns of the drafters of the
"Worker Paycheck Fairness Act" as well.
The author's proposed revision would hold a similar purpose as
the original "Worker Right to Know Act."'19 The author's revised
"Purpose" section would read as follows:
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that all workers are made
aware of the rights due them as per the Supreme Court's holding
in Communications Workers of America v. Beck, that they have
the right as non-union members to request a refund of their fees
used for purposes other than "collective bargaining, contract
administration and grievance adjustment"'191 and that they have
the opportunity to make an
informed decision as to their partici92
pation in a labor union.'
The "Worker Choice" or section 4 of the "Worker Right to Know
Act,"' 193 would be re-proposed in the revised legislation. This
amendment is necessary as it specifically defines what was decided
in NLRB v. General Motors Corp.;19 4 that workers may not be
required to join a union as a condition of employment, but rather
are "whittled down to [their] financial core."1 95 The National

Labor Relations Act appears to allow a requirement that workers
join a union as a condition of employment' 96 and such a proposed
change would make lucid what the law actually allows.
188. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
189. See Worker Right to Know Act, H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. (1996). The changes
suggested by the author's proposed revision are indicated by a bold font. This indication will
apply to the text accompanying notes 192 to 208.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. § 3 (1996).
H.R. 3580, § 2(1).
Compare H.R. 3580, § 3, with author's proposal
See H.R. 3580, § 4.
373 U.S. 734 (1963).
Id. at 742.
See Hearingson H.R. 3580, The Worker Right to Know Act Before the Subcomm. on

Employer-Employee Relations of the Comm. on Econ. and Educ. Opportunities,104th Cong.
301, 301-05 (1996) (testimony of Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr.).
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Moreover, section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act would
be amended by the author's proposal through the addition of the
following sentence at the end of the section:
A labor union or organization shall annually provide to each
worker a detailed report outlining the proposed expenditures for
the forthcoming year which is to be used by each employee to
ascertain whether they wish to become a union member or retain
their membership for the forthcoming year. Once said employee
decides to become a member of the union, he or she waives all
rights to objections to union expenditures on causes not related
to the representative197capacity of which said employee so consented for that year.
As was discussed above, section 5 or the "Worker Consent" section of the "Worker Right to Know Act" advocated the requirement of an annual signed written agreement of all workers before
their contributions could be used for purposes other than "collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment."'19 While this section did have the well-intended goal of
ensuring that employees are not forced to contribute to causes with
which they disagree, it is inconsistent with Beck and the Congressional intent to not become involved in the inner workings of a voluntary organization that was thought so crucial in the Beck
decision.' 99 Therefore, the author's proposed section (h) that
would appear at the end of section 8200 would make the following
changes to the Fawell Bill and would read as follows:
Prior to accepting into membership any employee, a union must
disclose annually a report outlining the proposed expenditures
for the forthcoming year. 'An employee subject to an agreement
between an employer and a labor organization requiring the payment of dues or fees to such organization as authorized in section
8 (a)(3) may not be required to pay to such organization, nor
may such organization accept payment of, any dues or fees not
197. Compare Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 7, 61 Stat. 136,
140 (1947) (amending National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449, 452
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994))), with author's proposal.
198. See Worker Right to Know Act, H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. § 5 (1996).
199. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 758-59.
200. Compare Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8, 61 Stat. 136,
140-43 (1947) (amending National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449,452-53
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994))) and H.R. 3580, § 5(a), with author's
proposal.
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related to collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment necessary to performing the duties of exclusive
representation unless the employee has agreed' through the voluntary act of membership in a union after the union has informed
the workers of its intent to contribute funds to causes not related
to "collective bargaining, contract administration or grievance
adjustment." 201
The author suggests the language of the "Worker Right to Know
Act" that attempted to amend section 302(c)(4) of the Labor Management Relations Act providing for written authorization should
also be changed to read as follows:
Provided further, [t]hat no amount may be deducted for dues
unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administration, or
grievance adjustment necessary to performing the duties of
exclusive representation unless the employee was informed of
the union's proposed expenditures prior to the employee's joining the union and said employee became a union member
nevertheless. 20 2
The author's revised proposal would also essentially utilize section 7 or the "Worker Notice" of the "Worker Right to Know Act"
but with changes to read as follows:
'(i) An employer shall be required to post a notice, of such size
and in such form as the Board shall prescribe, in conspicuous
places in and about its plants and offices, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted, informing
employees of their rights under section 7 of this Act and clarifying to' non-union member 'employees that an agreement requiring the payment of dues or fees to a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in subsection (a)(3) may
only require that' non-union member 'employees pay to such
organization any dues or fees related to collective bargaining,
contract administration, or grievance adjustment necessary to
performing the duties of exclusive representation.' Such exclusive representative shall be required to annually post a notice
addressed to all prospective union members informing them of
the union's proposed expenditures for the forthcoming year. 'A
copy of such notice shall be provided to each employee not later

201. See H.R. 3580, § 5(a).
202. See id. § 5(b).
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than 10 days after the first day of employment' or of the first of
the year; whichever is applicable.

203

Section 7 of the "Worker Right to Know Act" attempted to

amend section 8(b)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act to provide for equal participation by non-member contributors in the
affairs of the union related to "collective bargaining, contract
administration, or grievance adjustment. ' 20 4 The author's proposal
would retain this section and its language because it is appropriate
that if an employee is forced to contribute to a union that is obligated to negotiate a contract on behalf of all employees, all employees should have an equal say in its creation. The employee,
whether he or she is a member or not, will be bound by that negotiated collective bargaining agreement.20 5
Section 8 of the Bill, titled "Disclosure to Workers," attempted to
amend sections 201(b) and (c) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 to provide for detailed reporting
requirements. 20 6 The author's proposed revision would make a further amendment to the language to read as follows: "'Every labor
organization shall be required to attribute and report' proposed
expenditures for the year 'by function classification in such detail as
necessary to allow' all prospective union members for the forth207
coming year to decide if they wish to join or re-join the union.
As amended by the "Worker Right to Know Act," section 201(c) of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 simply would have applied to non-union members which is appropriate
and will be re-proposed in the author's revision. 20 8
Finally, the author's proposed revision would include from the
"Worker Paycheck Fairness Act," the idea of a ban on "retaliation
and coercion. '20 9 If a union announces it will contribute to a cause
in the upcoming year that a union member disagrees with, and that
member decides not to continue his or her membership for the
203. Compare H.R. 3580, § 6, with author's proposal.
204. H.R. 3580, § 7.
205. See Hearingson H.R. 3580, The Worker Right to Know Act Before the Subcomm. on
Employer-Employee Relations of the Comm. on Econ. and Educ. Opportunities,104th Cong.
233 (1996) (statement of Charles W. Baird, Ph.D.).
206. See H.R. 3580, § 8.
207. Compare H.R. 3580, § 8, with author's proposal.

208. See H.R. 3580, § 8(b).
209. Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1625, 105th Cong. § 7 (1997).
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upcoming year, it is important that no one in the union tries to
intimidate that person into changing their decision.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court in Communications Workers
of America v. Beck, held that workers who were subject to an
"agency shop" agreement could object to their fee contributions
being used for non-collective bargaining purposes and request a
refund of those fees if they were non-members of the union.21 0 The
holding did not extend this right to members of the union.21
Moreover, in the course of the decision, the Supreme Court considered the Taft-Hartley Act and found their decision in International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street112 to be controlling.21 3 In the process
of refuting the petitioner's arguments, they also took into account
the legislative history of Congress that essentially provided for the
unwillingness of Congress to become embroiled in the inner workings of a voluntary membership union.2 14 Therefore, when Harris

Fawell drafted a bill that was to "implement Beck, ' 215 providing for
the members of a union being able to pick and choose which causes
they wanted to support, he contradicted not only the holding of the
case he sought to "implement," but also the Congressional policy of
nonintervention into union affairs.
The author's proposal, addresses the concerns of the drafters of
the two Bills while remaining consistent with Beck. Requiring a
disclosure of the proposed expenditures prior to the worker joining
the union ensures that workers make an informed decision before
they join the organization. This will enable the non-union workers
to still request a refund of non-collective bargaining use of their
fees, as is consistent with Beck. Also, it addresses the drafters' concerns that union members be able to object. The union members
may object prior to their joining the union and if they discover after
they join, they disagree with their choice, they may refuse to renew
their membership the upcoming year based upon that year's report.
210. 487 U.S. 735, 762-63 (1988).
211. See id. at 759.

212. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
213. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 747-57.
214. Id.
215. See Bob Estill, Rep. FaweI4 Labor Square Off Over Dues, ST. J. REG,., June 21, 1996,

at 10.
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Finally, the "'free rider"' problem will be non-existent as all workers will be forced to pay for the benefits they receive and will not be
able to refuse paying for such.
Therefore, it is urged that the United States Congress take the
author's revised proposal into account the next time the issue of
what uses a union may apply workers' contributions to appears on
its agenda.
Eric J. Felsberg
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